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Abstract The decision to divorce may be affected by the characteristics of the
local community. Community characteristics may be barriers to divorce, or they
may increase the attractiveness of divorcing (e.g., access to a good remarriage
market), but our knowledge of such inﬂuences is sparse. This study examines two
such community-level factors: socio-economic conditions and the local marriage
market. In this study, discrete-time hazard models with community-level ﬁxed
effects are estimated using register-based data on Norwegian ﬁrst marriages during
the period from 1980 to 1999, with longitudinal information on both the community
and couple levels (N = 283,493). The results show that there are important com-
munity-level inﬂuences on couples’ divorce risk, but these change dramatically
when ﬁxed effects are introduced.
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Re ´sume ´ La de ´cision de divorcer peut e ˆtre inﬂuence ´e par les caracte ´ristiques
communautaires locales. Ces dernie `res peuvent constituer soit des freins a ` la
de ´cision de divorcer, soit augmenter son attractivite ´ (du fait par exemple d’un
marche ´ matrimonial e ´tendu), mais nos connaissances quant a ` ces inﬂuences restent
partielles. Cette e ´tude s’inte ´resse a ` deux facteurs au niveau communautaire : les
conditions socio-e ´conomiques et le marche ´ matrimonial local. Des mode `les de
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DOI 10.1007/s10680-010-9226-6risque a ` temps discret avec effets ﬁxes pour les variables communautaires, sont
estime ´sa ` partir de registres relatifs aux premiers mariages en Norve `ge pour la
pe ´riode allant de 1980 a ` 1999, et d’informations longitudinales tant pour la
communaute ´ que pour le couple (N = 283.493). Les re ´sultats montrent que les
caracte ´ristiques communautaires ont une inﬂuence importante sur la probabilite ´ de
divorcer, mais la prise en compte des effets ﬁxes modiﬁe conside ´rablement ces
re ´sultats.
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1 Introduction
The factors that contribute to the outcomes of marriages are subject to continuous
scrutiny by social scientists. A couple’s risk of divorce is inﬂuenced by various
characteristics of both spouses and their marriage, and large parts of this literature
discuss the role of spouses’ traits, circumstances, and intra-household processes
(White1990;LyngstadandJalovaara2010).Thefocusofthisstudyistheeffectofthe
community context on divorce rates, while at the same time considering the spouses’
backgrounds, economic situation, and other characteristics. It is conceivable that the
likelihood of divorce is affected by characteristics of the community, for example,
throughlocaldifferencesincommunitywealthorthestrengthofsocialnorms.Infact,
most theoretical arguments invoke characteristics of the local community as
determinants of divorce. Our knowledge of such factors, however, is very sparse.
Community effects have been found for a wide range of demographic phenomena,
such as marriage formation (White 1990; Lichter et al. 1991; Lloyd and South 1996;
South and Crowder 1999), fertility (Sucoff and Upchurch 1998; Kravdal 2002; Kulu
et al. 2007), and mortality (Pickett and Pearl 2001). However, only a handful of
contributions have touched upon the potential importance of the community context
formaritaldissolutionpatterns(Udry1983;SouthandLloyd1995;South2001;South
etal.2001).Inaddition,thesefewdivorcestudieshavebeenbasedondatasetsthatare
quite small, and many cover limited age ranges or marital durations and include few
community variables at the same time. More knowledge about the ways that
communities affect their inhabitants’ marital outcomes may be useful, not least
because this knowledge might help policymakers address the potentially negative
consequences of divorce for adults and children (Amato 1993, 2000).
In this article, I provide a broad analysis of the potential impact of community
characteristics on divorce risk. I review and clarify theoretical arguments on the
effect of community characteristics on divorce risk and empirically assess the effects
of several characteristics of the local community, including the local economic
conditions and the local marriage market, while controlling for relevant couple-level
characteristics. Discrete-time hazard models are estimated using a very rich register-
based data set that covers all ﬁrst marriages in Norway from 1980 to 1999, linked
with annual measurements of characteristics of all Norwegian municipalities over the
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123period from 1980 to 2002. With such detailed data on both couples and their
communities, it is possible to include ﬁxed effects at the community level that
control for time-invariant, unobserved community factors. This control is potentially
very important but has not been included in earlier studies.
2 Possible Pathways from Contextual Factors to Couples’ Divorce Risk
There may be multiple pathways from a couple’s community to their divorce risk.
Building on previous research in this area, I review several arguments about the
features of the community that may be important for divorce risk. All of the
arguments are presented within the larger framework of analytical sociology
(Hedstro ¨m 2005), where the various links between a community feature and a
couple’s divorce risk are denoted causal mechanisms.
These causal mechanisms are ‘‘microtheories’’ that represent a speciﬁc type of
community inﬂuence on couples’ divorce decisions. There may be multiple
mechanisms linking each community-level variable to divorce, which may work in
opposite directions. Unless there is strong reason to believe that one mechanism is
much more important than another, it is not possible to make a strong claim about
the expected total effect of a single community variable.
2.1 Marriage Market Balance and Population Density
The likelihood of divorce may be dependent on how easy it is (or is perceived to be)
for potential divorcees to ﬁnd a new partner. The macrostructural opportunity theory
of marital dissolution proposed by South et al. (2001) says that a person’s decision
to leave the current partner is contingent on his or her chance of meeting a new
partner. Therefore, this decision is affected by characteristics such as the degree of
sex segregation in the workplace and the sex composition of the population (South
et al. 2001). This literature suggests that the relative supply of spousal alternatives
affects the risk of marital dissolution. If, for example, a husband has more options
for a potential remarriage than his wife does, he would be more inclined to divorce
than she would (Udry 1983; South et al. 2001). If one of the spouses faces a
marriage market with numerous alternative partners or simply perceives the
likelihood of remarriage with a new partner as good, the couple’s risk of divorce
increases. A frequently cited contribution to the importance of this relative-supply
mechanism for divorce is the study by South and Lloyd (1995). They estimated the
effect of local spousal alternatives (measured by the ratio of single men to single
women) on the divorce rate, net of individual-level and some macro-level variables.
Their results showed that couples living in areas with sex imbalances had a higher
propensity to divorce. However, this line of reasoning might overstate the disruptive
effect of an abundant supply of alternative partners for one of the spouses. South
and Lloyd write, ‘‘It only takes one tempted, motivated partner to dissolve a
marriage,’’ but their arguments do not explicitly clarify why relative partner supply
leads to a stronger temptation to divorce only for the spouse who experiences a
relatively good market. There could also be an opposite effect that makes the other
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(or, in economic theory terms, allowing the partner to get a larger share of the utility
from marriage). This opposite effect can be called the commitment mechanism.
When measured through sex ratios, a good market for one spouse implies a bad
market for the other spouse, and the total net effect is indeterminate.
Moreover, it is not a simple matter to numerically measure the spouses’ relative
supply of potential partners. For example, due to data limitations, a ﬁxed age group
is often used to calculate the sex ratio. In my analysis, I use a slightly more reﬁned
and time-varying deﬁnition than that used in earlier studies. Of course, in the age of
Internet dating services and other means of communication between potential
partners, the age-speciﬁc sex composition and population density of the local area
are not the only possible indicators of the availability of alternative partners and the
costs of ﬁnding new partners. Even so, for the most part, social interaction takes
place in communities, and most people meet their partner in settings such as
workplaces and schools (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Lampard 2007). Given the
indeterminate nature of the relationship between marriage market conditions and
divorce risk suggested above, I do not offer a speciﬁc hypothesis. Nevertheless, I
include a slightly reﬁned measure of spousal alternatives in the model.
The sheer volume of the local marriage market might also play a role in divorce
risk. There might be differences among communities regarding how easy it is to
locate a sufﬁciently good match, which is equivalent to the search costs of ﬁnding a
(new) partner. If the search costs are relatively low in the community, unhappy
spouses should be relatively more willing to divorce and undertake a search for a
new partner. One of the ﬁndings that has been replicated numerous times in the
literature is that urbanites run a higher risk of divorce than couples living in rural
areas (Shelton 1987; Bracher et al. 1993; Kalmijn and Poortman 2006). The
anonymity offered by an urban environment might, for example, reduce the
perceived risk of initiating extramarital affairs or ease any stigma associated with
being divorced (Kalmijn and Uunk 2007; Lyngstad 2006). Another reason that
population density should matter is that the shorter distances and the superior
communications of urban centers reduce the costs associated with ﬁnding a new
partner, and the pool of persons in the local area among which a (future) divorcee
could search for a new partner is larger. In this context, one might argue that divorce
risk increases with the population density of the community. However, the
previously reported effects of place of residence were obtained without regard for
other community-related factors and focus exclusively on regional or urban/rural
differentials in divorce risk. It might be that such effects are seriously confounded
by other community-level variables.
2.2 Economic Conditions in the Community
The socio-economic structure of the community might also affect divorce rates in
severalways.Thecommondenominatoroftheseideasisthatrelativelevelsofwealth
and prosperity in communities produce non-economic social inﬂuences on spouses’
decision making, regardless of the spouses’ own economic situation. Mechanisms
linking economic conditions and divorce risk may work in either direction.
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123Theoretical discussions of the potential impact of disadvantaged neighborhoods
on family structure have suggested that divorce rates may be higher in such areas
(South 2001; South and Crowder 1999). Populations in poor areas often display high
rates of problem behavior (such as drug abuse), a general attitude of pessimism, and
lack of investment in the infrastructure. In studies of the effect of community on
health and crime outcomes, people who live in economically deprived areas have
more negative outcomes than others, all else being equal. The classic ‘‘Marienthal’’
study of the community effects of unemployment showed that high unemployment
has negative consequences not only for unemployed individuals but is also linked to
a retreat from public life, a general attitude of fatalism, lower political interest, and
the dissolution of social networks (Jahoda et al. 1933). These phenomena, which
could be conceptualized as either lower collective efﬁcacy (Sampson et al. 1997)o r
a depreciation of the social capital in the community (Astone et al. 1999), affect not
only the unemployed but also the larger community, and thus also married couples
in an average or good ﬁnancial position. One would therefore expect that economic
disadvantage leads to higher divorce rates, when the spouses’ own ﬁnancial
situation is controlled. A study in the United States found that an effect of
neighborhood socio-economic disadvantage could be fully explained by the
spouses’ incomes (South 2001). However, the data provided few opportunities to
control for other community-level factors.
Sociological reference group theory and social comparison theory predict that if a
community is relatively afﬂuent, residents’ standards of consumption will be higher
and spouses’ aspirations for consumption will be higher (Festinger 1954; Hyman
1960). It has been shown empirically that individual income aspirations increase with
average income in the community, regardless of the individuals’ income (Stutzer
2004), and that perceived well-being declines as one’s neighbors increase their
earnings (Luttmer 2005). These community effects on individuals’ preferences and
beliefs may lead to community differences in spouses’ evaluations of the economic
consequences of divorce. Relatively high economic costs of divorce could make
potential divorcees think twice about leaving their partners because, should the
relationship end, at least one of the spouses must ﬁnd new housing, and neither will
beneﬁtfromtheeconomiesofscaleofajointhousehold.Evenwhenacouple’sactual
economic situation is well controlled for, the change in consumption as a result of a
divorce might be perceived differently by people living in afﬂuent communities and
people living in poorer communities, thereby changing the attractiveness of
singlehood or remarriage relative to remaining married to the current partner. If the
economic consequences are perceived as severer in afﬂuent communities, divorce
rates might rise when economic conditions in the community deteriorate. Another
mechanism, working in the opposite direction, is that good economic conditions may
induce a general sense of economic optimism about the future, which leads people to
underestimate the economic changes associated with divorcing.
2.3 Aggregate Education
The average level of education in the community can also affect the divorce rate.
The possible routes from a community’s aggregate education to a couple’s divorce
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Aggregate education may also reﬂect the residual inﬂuence of economic conditions
after controlling for observed economic variables at both macro- and micro-levels.
An increasing average level of education and widening distribution of education
in society may be an engine driving society toward more emphasis on personal
freedom and self-realization (Inglehart 1990, 1997). Following this line of
reasoning, a large proportion of people with higher education in the community
might be indicative of a normative climate that is more liberal than in communities
with a lower proportion of such persons. Highly educated persons, at least in the
past, have tended to hold more accepting attitudes toward behaviors such as divorce
and homosexuality (Listhaug 1998). This result would suggest that communities
with high average education levels have higher divorce rates than other
communities.
Another possible mechanism linking aggregate education and the divorce rate,
although in the opposite direction, is a variant of social imitation. It is very well
documented, at least in Scandinavia, that highly educated couples have much lower
divorce rates than other couples regardless of labor force attachment, family
structure, and a host of other factors (Jalovaara 2003; Lyngstad 2004). Regardless of
why these couples enjoy lower divorce rates, their behavior might set a standard for
the community, and they may serve as role models. A social imitation mechanism
may therefore produce lower divorce rates in communities with a high proportion of
highly educated people.
A community with a high level of knowledge and skills might be a better place to
live regardless of individuals’ investments in education. This outcome might occur,
for example, through economic factors such as higher numbers of available, well-
paying jobs, higher rates of entrepreneurship, or a stronger feeling of economic
security, giving people a more optimistic economic outlook than in communities
with lower human capital. According to this perspective, a large number of people
with extended education in a community should be negatively correlated with
divorce risk. Once the economic circumstances in the community are perfectly
controlled, however, this economic component of aggregate education should not be
relevant. However, in most empirical analyses, the controls for economic conditions
are not perfect, and the effects of aggregate education might reﬂect these
components. An accurate prediction of how aggregate education affects divorce
rates is not possible from these arguments, but any result would indicate where to
look for the actual mechanism in subsequent analyses.
3 Data and Method
3.1 Data
The data for this study were obtained from various Norwegian administrative
registers. In Norway, a system of universal identity numbers uniquely identiﬁes each
individual who has ever ofﬁcially resided in the country. In administrative records,
this number is used to identify each individual and facilitates the linking of data from
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construct the data set used here, data on the population of marriages were generated
from time series of individuals’ marital status. This stage identiﬁed the couples, the
outcomes of their marriages, and other basic demographic information. Then data
from registers with other longitudinal information on the spouses were linked to the
couple data set. Finally, data on the community context were linked to the couple
data. It is important to understand that the couples do not self-report anything, but
rather that the data are collected from other government institutions. For example,
data on completed education are reported directly from the educational institutions to
the government, and data on individuals’ incomes are reported through annual tax
returns. These administrative register data allow us to avoid the problems with high
panel attrition and non-response rates that often plague longitudinal sample surveys.
For more information on administrative register data sources, their quality, accuracy,
and uses, see, for example, Røed and Raaum (2003).
A drawback of the register data set, apart from not providing subjective
evaluation variables, is that only marital unions are included. Cohabitation increased
in popularity in Norway over the study period. In 1980, cohabitation was a marginal
phenomenon among all but the youngest age group, but in 2000, between a quarter
and a third of all individuals in their 30s were cohabiting (Statistics Norway 2010).
It would be preferable to include informal unions in the analysis and thus generalize
the ﬁndings to the whole population of couples. However, because a majority of
Norwegian children live with married parents (Statistics Norway 2010) and a
majority of Norwegians expect to marry at some point in their lives (Lyngstad and
Noack 2005), it seems worthwhile to study only married couples from both a
scientiﬁc and policy perspective. It is possible, and even likely, that the prevalence
of cohabitation increased over the study period at different rates in different
communities. The prevalence of cohabitation is likely to inﬂuence people’s
marriage decisions and, consequently, which couples are selected into marriage. It is
unclear how these selection processes could translate into different community
effects on divorce risk or bias the estimated parameters.
The ﬁnal data set included 283,493 Norwegian ﬁrst marriages contracted from
1980 to 1999. The unit of analysis was the couple, and all couples were followed
until either divorce or censoring occurred. The observation period ended in 2002.
Time series of educational attainment and enrollment, annual labor market earnings,
and municipality of residence are available for both spouses during the whole period
(although there is a gap for educational attainment and enrollment for the years
1983 and 1984). In addition, there are fertility histories for each spouse, with
information on every child born to the spouse (including children born outside of the
current marriage). Municipality of residence deﬁnes the couple’s local community.
As the data include an annual measurement of spouses’ municipality of residence,
the couples could be followed even if they move between municipalities.
The community-level variables are taken partly from the Norwegian Social
Science Data Services’ Municipality Database and partly aggregated from register-
based, individual-level data ﬁles. The aggregate community variables were
generated based on population-wide registers, not using the couple-level data set.
I have annual measurements of all community-level variables.
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Discrete-time hazard models are estimated (Allison 1995). With this method, each
marriage record in the data set is split up into a number of observations of marriage
years. A couple observed for 10 years would thus contribute ten marriage years to the
data set. If a divorce takes place in year t, then the dependent variable is set to one for
the corresponding marriage year; otherwise, it is zero. After emigration or a spousal
death, the marriage observation was censored. Time units other than calendar years
could be used, but an annual step was reasonable and practical in this analysis. Only
the marriage years that have valid information on municipality of residence are
included in the analysis. The 3,266,225 marriage years were spread out over 434
communities and entered into a logistic regression model for the analysis.
When data are organized in hierarchical structures, multilevel methods should be
employed (Goldstein 2003). There are several possible ways of accommodating this
hierarchical data structure. In a multilevel study of divorce, the researcher is
typically faced with two separate problems. One is that couples are nested in
communities, which deﬂates the standard errors for community-level parameters
and may yield wrong hypothesis tests. This serious problem is often remedied by
including in the model a random effect term with identical draws for each
community in the model. This approach is considered by some to be the main
feature of a ‘‘multilevel model,’’ although any study that involves a hierarchical data
structure may be referred to by this name.
Even when standard errors are appropriately estimated, another problem remains:
unobserved factors may confound the relationship between the community
characteristics, on the one hand, and a couple’s decision making, on the other
hand. There are likely to be differences in divorce risk between communities along
some unmeasured variables. If these are associated with the observed community
factors, these differences will confound the relationship between the observed
community variables and couples’ divorce risk. Parameters of effects of community
variables may thus be biased. All previous studies are to my knowledge subject to
this important criticism.
In the ﬁnal model, I take the very powerful ﬁxed-effects approach where
unobservable variables at the level of the community are included as a large set of
dummy variables. Each dummy variable represents a municipality and captures the
time-constant features of this municipality and its inﬂuences on the divorce rate. The
featuresthatareconstantover time may include valuesandnorms, aspects suchasthe
built environment or features of dominant industries. A municipality dominated by a
military base might be different from a municipality that is dominated by industrial
plants but is otherwise similar. The ﬁxed-effects approach has the advantage over
random effect models that the unobserved factors captured by the ﬁxed-effect
dummiescanbecorrelatedwiththeobservedcommunityfactors.However,itrequires
theobservedcommunityvariablestobetime-varying.Otherwise,therewillbeperfect
collinearity between the constant-over-time community variables and community
dummy variables. Studies using similar register data have employed this method to
estimateparametersforthe effectofcommunityvariables onotherdemographicrates
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123(Kravdal 2007, 2008; Rindfuss et al. 2007). Mathematically, the model that was
estimated can be written as
ln
PðYijt ¼ 1Þ
1   PðYijt ¼ 1Þ
¼ at þ bXij þ dZijt þ kMjt þ gj;
where Yijt represents the outcome dummy variable, at are the duration baseline
parameters, b and d are parameters for time-constant and time-varying couple-level
variables, k are parameters for community-level variables, and gj represents the
community ﬁxed effects. The models without ﬁxed effects are identical, with the
exception that the last term, gj, is not included. Note that the ﬁxed effects do not
represent the mean of the community variables, but rather the contribution of
unmeasured and omitted community variables on divorce risk.
Why is a random effect at the community level not included in addition to the
community ﬁxed-effects controls for the model to provide better estimates of the
standard errors of community-effect parameters? The main reason for this is that
computational problems arise when estimating such models with very large
multilevel data sets (typically, register-based data sets). In this case, estimation
failed with SAS PROC NLMIXED, aML, and Stata. The technical reason is that the
likelihood value ‘‘underﬂows’’ (becomes too small for the computer to represent it)
for large clusters of sub-observations, such as major cities. Other scholars using
similar data and similar methods have experienced the same problems (e.g., Kravdal
2007). If the estimation algorithm for a model with a random effect were to
successfully converge, standard errors would likely be markedly bigger.
When a couple moves from one municipality to another, in the years following
the move, their value on the community variables will change to those measured for
their destination. This result means that their risk of divorce in the years subsequent
to the move will be affected by the community factors deﬁned by the characteristics
of the new community.
3.3 Individual- and Couple-Level Variables
All variables pertaining to the couple are measured for both spouses where relevant.
Marriage duration, marriage cohort, the couple’s annual labor market earnings,
spouses’ educational attainment, spouses’ educational activity, their parity and the
age of their youngest child, and spouses’ family structure and ages at marriage are all
measured by categorical variables. Note that separate parameters are estimated for a
husband’s and wife’s characteristics, unless the variable captures a characteristic of
the marriage or household (which, by deﬁnition, is the same for both spouses). The
spouses’ annual labor market earnings are measured ininﬂation-adjusted Norwegian
Kroner with two ﬁve-category variables. Capital incomes or public transfers are not
included in this earnings measure. A different categorization is used for men and
women because of women’s generally lower labor market earnings (a product of
part-time work or spells of unpaid maternity leave). Educational attainment is
grouped in four levels: primary, secondary, college level, and postgraduate level. As
no effect of educational homogamy has been found in other Scandinavian studies
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for the spouses’ educational attainments. The variables are time-varying and
updated annually (with the exception of 1983 and 1984). Educational activity is
measured by a time-varying dummy variable. Educational activity might lead to
low labor market earnings, but it may also provide access to a large pool of
potential partners. For some spouses, it might also represent a preparation for
single life in the case of divorce; an investment in more human capital can
alleviate economic problems after divorce. Parity and age of youngest child is
grouped into ten categories, with childless as the baseline. For parities one, two,
and three or more, there are three categories of ages: child is aged less than 1 year,
from 1 to 6 years, or 7 years or older. The variables measuring spouses’ family
structures are categorized as follows: intact family, non-intact family due to
parents’ death, and non-intact family due to divorce. Indeterminate cases constitute
a separate category. These variables are measured at the time of the spouses’
marriage. In addition to these control variables, period effects are included as a set
of 1-year dummy variables (not shown in tables).
3.4 Community-Level Variables
All community-level variables are computed separately for each municipality and
each year unless otherwise noted (i.e., they are annual community-speciﬁc time
series). Population density is included as a continuous variable. Clearly, using
only population density is a crude measure for capturing the urban/rural
dimensions because some communities might have large unsettled areas driving
the population density down, while the population is actually concentrated in a
few larger, high-density settlements. However, any classiﬁcation would potentially
contain equally important sources of bias. With the chosen deﬁnition, this study
beneﬁts from an essentially time-varying variable that can be included in ﬁxed-
effect models.
Marriage market conditions are measured by the deviation from the sex ratio of
the local population in two speciﬁc age ranges. It is likely that as individuals’ age,
their preferred age for an alternative partner also increases. I include only persons
that are of about the same age as the spouses themselves, taking into account that
the husband is usually slightly older than the wife. The husband’s alternatives are
deﬁned as women in somewhat younger age range to women slightly older than he
is (-10 to 5 years). The wife’s alternatives are deﬁned as men in a slightly younger
age range to men somewhat older than she is (-5 to 10 years). Although all
assumptions about age preferences are arbitrary to some extent, ignoring age norms
and preferences for partners would be less effective. South and Lloyd (1995)
required persons to be single to present a suitable alternative. I assume that in a
highly dynamic family system with high levels of union disruption, even married
individuals may be considered alternative partners. I will thus use the sex ratio of all
individuals, regardless of marital status, in the two age ranges as the measure of
spousal alternatives. The partner supply might affect men and women differently, as
do several other characteristics (Kalmijn and Poortman 2006). To accommodate
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and Lloyd (1995), a curvilinear relationship between spousal alternatives and
divorce risk is allowed, using a quadratic term. This is the only variable receiving
this treatment because there are no theoretical reasons to expect non-linearities in
the other community effects. Experiments were conducted to insure that no
important empirical pattern was undiscovered.
Average labor market earnings in each municipality are measured in thousands
of inﬂation-adjusted Norwegian Kroner, with 1980 as the baseline year. As only
labor market earnings of persons aged 16–66 are included, pensions and capital
income do not contribute to the average. The male unemployment rate is deﬁned
as the proportion of registered unemployed men to the number of men aged
16–67 years in the municipality. Aggregate education is deﬁned as the proportion
of persons with some tertiary education in a given calendar year. All individuals in
the municipality who are older than 19 years of age are included in the
denominator. Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for all community-level variables
calculated on the basis of all community-year observations. The various
community-level variables are correlated, with absolute estimates ranging from
0.03 to 0.8 (mean income and proportion with higher education). This is further
evidence for including multiple measures of community context in the same
model.
4 Results
I estimate two discrete-time hazard models. Both models include all couple-level
variables, duration of marriage, and period effects. First, I estimate a model with
community variables included but where unobserved community factors are
ignored. In the second model, I introduce community ﬁxed effects, which control
for unobserved variation between communities. In the following sections, I
comment on the results for each domain of community inﬂuences across models.
Table 2 shows the unstandardized parameter estimates, associated standard errors,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for community-level variables calculated on the basis of all marriage-year
observations
Community variables M SD
Population density (persons/km
2) 267.26 370.58
Alternative sex ratio (number of men to 100 women) 102.90 8.37
Proportion with higher education (%) 20.18 8.07
Mean income (1000 Norwegian Kroner) 66.70 12.95
Unemployment rate (%) 3.04 1.51
Source: Calculations on register data on Norwegian ﬁrst marriages 1980–1999
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standardized coefﬁcients were calculated as the change in odds for one standard
deviation change in the community variable. Complete results from the two
regression models are reported in Table 3 (Appendix).
4.1 Results from the Model without Fixed Effects
In Model 1, all of the community characteristics are included, and one can assess the
importance of one community factor independently of the other observed
community factors included in the model. Unobserved factors at the community
level are ignored. Only one parameter estimate for community variables is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Population density does not have a measurable
impact on the risk of divorce in this model. The parameter estimates for the
remaining variables are all signiﬁcantly different from zero. A high rate of male
unemployment, a high level of mean earnings, and a high proportion of highly
educated people in the community are all associated with a higher divorce risk for
couples living under such circumstances. These results do lend some support to the
idea that community economic conditions impact couples’ divorce risk. However,
implications for theory are not clear as the two relevant variables, mean earnings
and male unemployment, pull in opposite directions.
Contrary to the ﬁndings of earlier studies, an imbalanced remarriage market does
not markedly increase divorce risk. According to this model, large deviations in the
sex ratio are associated with lower risks of divorce, particularly so if the remarriage
market favors men (i.e., if there are fewer men per woman in the appropriate age
groups).
Table 2 Parameter estimates for community-level variables included in discrete-time hazard models of
divorce
Community variable Model 1: model without ﬁxed effects Model 2: model with ﬁxed effects
Beta SE p-value Effect
measure
a
Beta SE p-value Effect
measure
a
Population density 0.00003 0.00002 0.062 1.01 -0.0007 0.0004 0.060 0.77
Sex ratio of spousal
alternatives
0.0988 0.0081 \0.001 0.92 0.0973 0.0088 \0.001 0.92
Sex ratio of spousal
alternatives squared
-0.0005 0.00004 \0.001 -0.0005 0.00001 \0.001
Proportion with
higher education
0.0081 0.0013 \0.001 1.07 -0.0335 0.0063 \0.001 0.76
Mean earnings 0.0047 0.0010 \0.001 1.06 0.0044 0.0029 0.216 1.06
Unemployment rate 0.0395 0.0049 \0.001 1.06 -0.0088 0.0072 0.342 0.99
Source: Calculations on register data on Norwegian ﬁrst marriages 1980–1999
a These columns report the relative change in odds of divorce for a change equal to one standard
deviation in the community variable. For the sex ratio variable the relative change in odds is calculated
from the mean sex ratio
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1234.2 Results from Model with Community Fixed Effects
Model 2 includes community-level ﬁxed effects and provides an accurate control for
unobserved time-constant factors at the community level. This control is important
because the parameters for the community variables in Model 1 may be severely
confounded.
Many parameter estimates change markedly when the unobserved factors at the
community level are taken into account. One example of this type of change is the
parameter estimate for aggregate education, which again emerges as a signiﬁcant
predictor of divorce. However, in this model, the parameter estimate is turned
around. There seems to be an important divorce-reducing effect in communities
with a high proportion of highly educated people when other unobserved
characteristics of the community are held constant. This ﬁnding implies that some
time-constant unobserved factor is positively correlated with divorce and negatively
correlated with aggregate education, and that inclusion of the ﬁxed-effects controls
for this factor. It is not atypical to see such reversals in studies using community
ﬁxed effects. A similar case is reported in Rindfuss et al. (2007). With the data at
hand, it is difﬁcult to gain more insight into the nature of this unobserved factor, but
it is clear that mere associations of aggregate levels of education with divorce
should not be understood to represent any causal mechanism, even when other
characteristics of the community are controlled.
Population density is still not a signiﬁcant predictor of divorce when unobserved
factors are included, suggesting that the frequently observed higher risk of divorce
for urbanites cannot be due to a higher population density in cities (for example,
because of lower search costs). It is clear that community economic conditions are
not particularly important predictors of marital dissolution. The unemployment and
earnings variables become insigniﬁcant with the introduction of ﬁxed effects.
The only result that is stable across models is the effect of the sex ratio of
alternative partners. These parameters are statistically signiﬁcant, go in the same
direction, and are of approximately the same magnitude as those obtained from
Model 1. The total impact of a slightly imbalanced marriage market is small, but
with extreme sex ratios, the relative odds of divorce decline rapidly. The curvilinear
relationship reaches its maximum at sex ratios of around 97 men per 100 women—
in effect, at near parity between the sexes.
When one compares the magnitude of the parameter estimates for community
effects from Model 2 and estimates for typical couple-level variables, it can be
tempting to conclude that community effects are unimportant for divorce decision
making. Such temptations should be resisted. For example, an increase of one
standard deviation in the proportion of people with higher education is associated
with a reduction in the odds of divorce of around 15%, which is comparable in
magnitude to commonly found effects of individual or couple-level determinants.
4.3 Fixed-Effects Estimates (Not Shown in Tables)
Ranked by size, the ﬁxed-effects estimates obtained from Model 2 show a familiar
pattern: the southwestern region generally displays the lowest divorce risk, net of all
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however, also have low divorce rates. Fixed effects for urban communities are
mostly positive, indicating higher risks of divorce. Therefore, there seems to be
some time-constant factor, unrelated to population density, which produces the
urban/rural difference demonstrated quite often in the literature. One possible
explanation is that urban areas are culturally liberal environments where acceptance
of divorce is high, and this phenomenon is not captured by any of the observed
community-level variables or by the controls for unobserved time-constant factors
considered in the ﬁxed-effect models.
4.4 Results for Control Variables
All of the couple level, variables included in the models conform to recently
published results on divorce determinants in the Nordic countries (Jalovaara 2003;
Lyngstad 2006). I ﬁnd negative effects for both spouses’ ages at marriage,
educational attainment, and the number and age of children. Parents’ divorce,
educational activity, and wife’s earnings are positively related to divorce risk. The
couple-level factors are also remarkably stable across models, both with and without
all community-level variables. The duration pattern reaches its peak around the
sixth year of marriage and subsequently declines, while there is a monotonic
increase in divorce risk over the period as a whole.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In summary, this study has shown that there is substantial variation in divorce risk
between different community contexts, but some theoretically expected community
effects do not appear. In addition, it is clear that unobserved community factors are
important and are correlated with the observed community variables. How can these
results be understood in light of the theoretical arguments and predictions?
First, many previous studies found urban areas to have the highest divorce rates.
Many of these studies did not have access to a large set of other community-level
variables, nor could they control for many couple-level characteristics. A more
critical view on this assertion is now warranted. From the results obtained in this
study, it seems likely that the idea that urban areas have higher divorce rates is too
simplistic. Measures of population density or urban/rural residence might pick up
various other community inﬂuences when included in models of divorce. When
included as the only community factor, the parameter for population density shows
a positive effect (this result is not shown in the tables). When the other observed and
unobserved community factors are included, as in models 1 and 2, the effect is not
measurably different from zero. The implication is that the higher divorce risk of
urbanites cannot be explained by the higher population density and lower search
costs in urban environments. Urbanites have a higher risk, but it is not because they
live in densely populated areas but because of other features of their environment.
Second, a solid ﬁnding from the statistical analysis is that the availability of
potential partners, when deﬁned as an age-staggered sex ratio, is not associated with
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123an increase in the divorce rate, but with a small decline. As argued above, there are
multiple mechanisms linking spousal alternatives to divorce, rendering the effect of
this variable theoretically indeterminate. The mechanism suggested by previous
studies was that spouses with many options would be tempted to leave their current
marriage, driving dissolution rates up. However, this temptation mechanism goes
hand in hand with an opposite mechanism based on commitment. When the sex
imbalance is very large, it should be obvious to both spouses which one of them has
good or poor prospects for remarriage. In such situations, a couple could perhaps
reorient itself away from possible alternative partners in an attempt to neutralize the
outside ‘‘threat.’’ Of course, it is also possible that both or neither of the two
suggested mechanisms is at work in the divorce process. In that case, a null effect or
estimates close to a null effect could be observed. An alternative speciﬁcation with
dummy variables was also used, but it yielded results that were similar to those
reported here.
Regardless of its exact interpretation, the result shows that, at least in contexts
where there are large and probably easily identiﬁable imbalances, the temptation
mechanism does not dominate couples’ behavior. This ﬁnding is clearly not
consonant with what has been called the ‘‘macrostructural-opportunity theory of
marital dissolution’’ (South 2001), which argues that the likelihood of divorcing is
affected by the supply of alternative partners for remarriage. Either the measure of
spousal alternatives used here is insufﬁcient to assess the ratio of actual relevant
alternatives, or the idea that the relative supply of alternatives should increase rates
of divorce is incorrect or too simplistic. Recent empirical studies of the impact of
sex distributions in workplaces ﬁnd some evidence for the ‘‘macro-structural
opportunity hypothesis’’ (McKinnish 2007; Svarer 2007), but this study clearly does
not. The reader must be aware, however, that spousal alternatives are notoriously
difﬁcult to measure, and no attempt was made in this analysis to measure the
spouses’ number of actual alternatives using social network data or similar sources.
However, these results show that results from previous studies linking spousal
alternatives in the local community (as deﬁned by geographical area) to divorce risk
should be interpreted with more caution.
Turning to the arguments about economic conditions in the community, a major
conclusion is that important aspects of the local economy, although measured
crudely by average earnings and unemployment, seem completely unimportant for
couples’ decisions to divorce, contrary to theoretical predictions. One suggested
mechanism linked the relative poverty of a community with a higher divorce risk
through a number of possible causal pathways, while others suggested that divorce
decisions are affected by spouses’ perceptions of the post-divorce standard of living
and that these perceptions vary with the economic standing of those in one’s
environment. With the results from Model 2, it is clear that the link between the
economic situation in the community and the divorce risk is either ignorable or that
neither of these mechanisms dominates the others and that they together (possibly in
concert with yet other mechanisms) produce a null effect. However, these ﬁndings
must be understood within a wider national context, aspects of which include a
generous welfare state system, positive attitudes toward economic egalitarianism, a
compressed wage distribution, and extensive legal protection of employees in the
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the impact of business cycles on the population’s welfare level. Thus, the
Norwegian case should be considered a conservative test of these ideas.
The effect of aggregate education level, or the stock of human capital in the
community, changes sign when unobserved community factors are controlled for.
According to Model 2, an increase in aggregate education leads to a marked
decrease in the divorce rate. This dramatic change in parameter estimate must be
due to a correlation between aggregate education and some feature of the local
community that is constant over time. Assuming that geographical differences in
normative structures are fairly stable over time, as has been shown for a number of
demographic behaviors by Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002), I suspect that such
structures may make up a sizable portion of the unobserved factors. If this
suspicion is correct and there is a correlation between aggregate education and the
normative climate in the community, we will observe a positive effect of aggregate
education in Model 1 that is spurious. Such a correlation may explain the change
between models in the effect of aggregate education. In the ﬁrst model, the
estimated effect of aggregate education is the sum of the causal effect of education
and a spurious effect due to a correlation between highly educated populations and
liberal populations in communities. Once the spurious component is controlled for
by way of the ﬁxed effects included in the second model, we observe a parameter
estimate of aggregate education that should be closer to the causal effect of
education.
The interpretation of the negative effect of aggregate education in Model 2 is
not unambiguous. Communities with high average education might have more
opportunities for marriage education or counseling. This ﬁnding corresponds with
the strong negative effects found for the spouses’ individual educations (Jalovaara
2003; Lyngstad 2006). One possible explanation for the result for aggregate
education is that it emerges due to social imitation. Divorce rates are reduced for
couples living in communities with high levels of aggregate education because the
spouses’ social networks might contain people with more education, and the
spouses learn or imitate something that reduces the divorce rate of highly educated
people. The nature of this feature, which is imitated or learned through social
networks and is relevant for marital dissolution, is unclear. A second possibility is
that, even though the economic conditions in the community are controlled, these
covariates may not pick up all of the contributions of variation in such conditions.
However, because the economic condition measures are unimportant, this
explanation seems less likely. A third and ﬁnal interpretation of the effect of
aggregate education is connected to differences in actual marriage market
conditions by spouses’ education levels. Assuming that people have preferences
for partners with education levels similar to their own, a community with many
highly educated people (who enjoy relatively low divorce rates) will produce a
particularly poor remarriage market that might not be captured by the general sex
ratio of spousal alternatives used here.
The total impact of community characteristics is demonstrated to be modest but
comparable in magnitude to some well-known predictors of divorce at the couple
level. The most serious limitations of this study are that cohabitants are excluded
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an indicator of unemployment would be strongly associated with having very low
labor market earnings, which is included in the model. There are no theoretical
arguments for why the community effects should affect cohabiting and married
couples differently. The lack of data on cohabiting unions limits the generality of
these ﬁndings to marital unions.
An important general conclusion that may be drawn from these results is that
observed community characteristics will be correlated with unobserved community
characteristics variables, and thus, parameter estimates for the former will be biased.
It is clear from the results presented in this study that estimates of community
effects in divorce rate models are very sensitive to the inclusion of ﬁxed-effects
controls for unobserved characteristics of communities. As the ﬁxed-effect controls
may summarize a wide range of inﬂuences on divorce risk, it is difﬁcult to give a
substantive interpretation to the change in coefﬁcients. The changes mean that
something unobserved, fairly stable over time, and related to each community is
affecting couples’ likelihood of divorcing through a set of unspeciﬁed mechanisms.
For example, this might include (but would not be limited to) deeper socio-cultural
mores and value systems as well as features of the built and natural environment.
The fact that the results for observed community factors change when ﬁxed effects
are included implies that the unobserved factors are associated with the observed
variables and that such controls should be included in future studies.
In turn, this general conclusion also implies that the value of studies of
community context without controls for unobservable community variables is rather
limited, unless the goal of the research effort is merely to provide a description of
correlations between contextual variables and demographic behavior rather than to
make a claim for a causal relationship between community characteristics and
couples’ divorce decisions. Further research should explore in more depth the causal
mechanisms responsible for the results reported here, such as what mechanism is
behind the negative effects on the divorce rate of living among highly educated
people and why a high availability of alternative partners seems to reduce divorce
risk, contrary to theoretical predictions.
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123Table 3 Complete results from discrete-time hazard regression models of divorce in Norwegian ﬁrst
marriages 1980–2002
Variable Category Model 1: no ﬁxed-effects Model 2: with ﬁxed-effects
B SE Bp B SE Bp
Intercept -9.02 0.43 \0.001 -8.31 0.49 \0.001
Duration 1 -4.99 0.13 \0.001 -4.99 0.13 \0.001
2 -1.53 0.03 \0.001 -1.53 0.03 \0.001
3 -0.44 0.02 \0.001 -0.44 0.02 \0.001
4 -0.13 0.02 \0.001 -0.13 0.02 \0.001
5–7
8–10 -0.06 0.01 \0.001 -0.06 0.01 \0.001
11–14 -0.26 0.02 \0.001 -0.25 0.02 \0.001
15?- 0.57 0.02 \0.001 -0.57 0.02 \0.001
Husband’s age at
marriage
Up to 24 0.12 0.01 \0.001 0.13 0.01 \0.001
25–29
30–34 -0.03 0.01 0.045 -0.02 0.01 0.131
35?- 0.09 0.03 \0.001 -0.07 0.03 0.009
Wife’s at age marriage Up to 24 0.33 0.01 \0.001 0.35 0.01 \0.001
25–29
30–34 -0.29 0.02 \0.001 -0.29 0.02 \0.001
35?- 0.93 0.04 \0.001 -0.91 0.04 \0.001
Husband’s education Primary 0.20 0.01 \0.001 0.21 0.01 \0.001
Secondary
College -0.28 0.01 \0.001 -0.29 0.01 \0.001
Graduate -0.41 0.02 \0.001 -0.42 0.02 \0.001
Missing 0.33 0.05 \0.001 0.31 0.05 \0.001
Wife’s education Primary 0.28 0.01 \0.001 0.27 0.01 \0.001
Secondary
College -0.31 0.01 \0.001 -0.31 0.01 \0.001
Graduate -0.38 0.04 \0.001 -0.37 0.04 \0.001
Missing 0.39 0.06 \0.001 0.38 0.06 \0.001
Husband’s income Less than
50 K
0.41 0.01 \0.001 0.43 0.02 \0.001
50–100 K 0.09 0.01 \0.001 0.09 0.01 \0.001
100–150 K
150–200 K -0.01 0.02 0.488 0.01 0.02 0.833
200 K? 0.05 0.02 0.056 0.08 0.02 0.002
Wife’s income Less than
25 K
-0.47 0.02 \0.001 -0.45 0.02 \0.001
25–50 K -0.58 0.02 \0.001 -0.56 0.02 \0.001
50–100 K -0.41 0.02 \0.001 -0.41 0.02 \0.001
100–150 K
150 K? 0.09 0.04 0.026 0.11 0.04 0.005
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Variable Category Model 1: no ﬁxed-effects Model 2: with ﬁxed-effects
B SE Bp B SE Bp
Husband’s family
structure
Intact family
Parental
death
0.03 0.02 0.239 0.03 0.02 0.278
Parental
divorce
0.43 0.02 \0.001 0.39 0.02 \0.001
Indeterminate 0.18 0.01 \0.001 0.17 0.01 \0.001
Wife’s family structure Intact family
Parental
death
0.04 0.02 0.081 0.04 0.02 0.075
Parental
divorce
0.59 0.01 \0.001 0.55 0.01 \0.001
Indeterminate 0.29 0.01 \0.001 0.28 0.01 \0.001
Husband’s school
enrollment
No
Yes -0.01 0.02 0.755 -0.02 0.02 0.342
Wife’s school
enrollment
No
Yes 0.46 0.02 \0.001 0.45 0.02 \0.001
Parity and age of
youngest child
Childless
1. 0 years -1.58 0.04 \0.001 -1.57 0.04 \0.001
1. 1–6 years -0.34 0.01 \0.001 -0.34 0.01 \0.001
1. 7? years 0.02 0.02 0.084 0.03 0.02 0.251
2. 0 years -1.65 0.03 \0.001 -1.64 0.03 \0.001
2. 1–6 years -0.59 0.01 \0.001 -0.58 0.01 \0.001
2. 7? years -0.34 0.02 \0.001 -0.32 0.02 \0.001
3?. 0 years -2.03 0.06 \0.001 -2.01 0.06 \0.001
3?.1 -
6 years
-0.82 0.02 \0.001 -0.80 0.02 \0.001
3?.7 ? years -0.40 0.03 \0.001 -0.38 0.03 \0.001
Population density 0.00003 0.00002 0.063 -0.0007 0.0004 0.060
Alternative sex ratio linear 0.0988*** 0.0081 \0.001 0.0973*** 0.0088 \0.001
Alternative sex ratio squared -0.0005*** 0.00004 \0.001 -0.0005*** 0.0000 \0.001
Proportion with higher education 0.0082*** 0.0013 \0.001 -0.0335*** 0.0063 \0.001
Mean income 0.0047*** 0.0010 \0.001 0.0044 0.0029 0.216
Unemployment rate 0.0395*** 0.0049 \0.001 -0.0088 0.0072 0.342
-2 log likelihood 495713.5 493891.5
Note: In both of these models all community characteristics are included. Estimates for period effects and,
for Model 2, the community ﬁxed-effects are not shown in order to save space
* p\5%; ** p\1%; *** p\0.1%
Community Effects on Divorce Risk in Norway 75
123References
Allison, P. D. (1995). Survival analysis using the SAS system. Cary, NC: SAS Institute.
Amato, P. R. (1993). Children’s adjustment to divorce-theories, hypotheses, and empirical support.
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 55(1), 23–38.
Amato, P. R. (2000). The consequences of divorce for adults and children. Journal of Marriage and the
Family, 62(4), 1269–1287.
Astone, N. M., Nathanson, C. A., Schoen, R., & Kim, Y. J. (1999). Family demography, social theory,
and investment in social capital. Population and Development Review, 25(1), 1–32.
Bracher, M., Santow, G., Morgan, S. P., & Trussel, J. (1993). Marriage dissolution in Australia: Models
and explanations. Population Studies, 47(3), 403–425.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–140.
Goldstein, H. (2003). Multilevel statistical models (3rd ed.). London: Arnold.
Hedstro ¨m, P. (2005). Dissecting the social. On the principles of analytical sociology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hyman, H. H. (1960). Reﬂections on reference groups. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 24(3), 383–396.
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrialized societies. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and post-modernization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P. M., & Zeisel, H. (1933). Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal: Ein
soziographischer Versuch ueber die Wirkungen langdauernder Arbeitslosigkeit, mit einem Anhang
zur Geschichte der Soziographie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Jalovaara, M. (2003). The joint effects of marriage partners’ socioeconomic positions on the risk of
divorce. Demography, 40(1), 67–81.
Kalmijn, M., & Flap, H. (2001). Assortative meeting and mating: Unintended consequences of organized
settings for partner choices. Social Forces, 79(4), 1289–1312.
Kalmijn, M., & Poortman, A.-R. (2006). His or her divorce? The gendered nature of divorce and its
determinants. European Sociological Review, 22(2), 201–214.
Kalmijn, M., & Uunk, W. (2007). Regional value differences in Europe and the social consequences of
divorce: A test of the stigmatization hypothesis. Social Science Research, 36(2), 447–468.
Kravdal, Ø. (2002). The impact of individual and aggregate unemployment on fertility in Norway.
Demographic Research, 6(10), 264–294.
Kravdal, Ø. (2007). A ﬁxed-effects multilevel analysis of how community family structure affects
individual mortality in Norway. Demography, 44(3), 519–537.
Kravdal, Ø. (2008). Does income inequality really inﬂuence individual mortality? Results from a ‘ﬁxed-
effects analysis’ where constant unobserved municipality characteristics are controlled. Demo-
graphic Research, 18(7), 205–232.
Kulu, H., Vikat, A., & Andersson, G. (2007). Settlement size and fertility in the Nordic countries.
Population Studies, 61(3), 265–285.
Lampard, R. (2007). Couples’ places of meeting in late 20th century Britain: Class, continuity and
change. European Sociological Review, 23(3), 357–371.
Lesthaeghe, R., & Neels, K. (2002). From the ﬁrst to the second demographic transition: An interpretation
of the spatial continuity of demographic innovation in France, Belgium and Switzerland. European
Journal of Population, 18(4), 325–360.
Lichter, D. T., LeClere, F. B., & McLaughlin, D. (1991). Local marriage markets and the marital
behaviour of black and white men. American Journal of Sociology, 96(4), 843–867.
Listhaug, O. (1998). Norske verdier og holdninger 1982–1996: Sentrale verdier endrer seg sakte.
Samfunnsspeilet, 12(1), 2–9.
Lloyd, K. M., & South, S. J. (1996). Contextual inﬂuences on young men’s transition to ﬁrst marriage.
Social Forces, 74(3), 1097–1119.
Luttmer, E. F. P. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120(3), 963–1002.
Lyngstad, T. H. (2004). The impact of parents’ and spouses’ education on divorce rates in Norway.
Demographic Research, 10(5), 122–142.
Lyngstad, T. H. (2006). Why do couples with highly educated parents have higher divorce risk? European
Sociological Review, 22(1), 49–60.
76 T. H. Lyngstad
123Lyngstad, T. H., & Noack, T. (2005). Vil de velge bort familien? Analyser av unge nordmenns ekteskaps-
og fruktbarhetsintensjoner. Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning, 8(3), 120–134.
Lyngstad, T. H., & Jalovaara, M. (2010). A review of the antecedents of union dissolution. Demographic
Research, 23(10), 257–292.
McKinnish, T. G. (2007). Sexually integrated workplaces and divorce—Another form of on-the-job
search. Journal of Human Resources, 42(2), 331–352.
Pickett, K. E., & Pearl, M. (2001). Multilevel analyses of neighbourhood socioeconomic context and
health outcomes: A critical review. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 55(2),
111–122.
Rindfuss, R. R., Guilkey, D., Morgan, S. P., Kravdal, Ø., & Guzzo, K. B. (2007). Child care availability
and ﬁrst-birth timing in Norway. Demography, 44(2), 345–372.
Røed, K., & Raaum, O. (2003). Administrative registers—Unexplored reservoirs of scientiﬁc knowledge?
Economic Journal, 113(488), F258–F281.
Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighbourhoods and violent crime: A multilevel
study of collective efﬁcacy. Science, 277(5328), 918–924.
Shelton, B. A. (1987). Variations in divorce rates by community size—A test of the social integration
explanation. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 49(4), 827–832.
South, S. J. (2001). The geographic context of divorce: Do neighborhoods matter? Journal of Marriage
and the Family, 63(3), 755–766.
South, S. J., & Crowder, K. D. (1999). Neighborhood effects on family formation: Concentrated poverty
and beyond. American Sociological Review, 64(1), 113–132.
South, S. J., & Lloyd, K. M. (1995). Spousal alternatives and marital dissolution. American Sociological
Review, 60(1), 21–35.
South, S. J., Trent, K., & Shen, Y. (2001). Changing partners: Toward a macrostructural-opportunity
theory of marital dissolution. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 63(3), 743–754.
Statistics Norway. (2010). Available from http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/Default_FR.asp?PX
Sid=0&nvl=true&PLanguage=0&tilside=selectvarval/deﬁne.asp&Tabellid=06854.
Stutzer, A. (2004). The role of income aspirations in individual happiness. Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organization, 54(1), 89–109.
Sucoff, C. A., & Upchurch, D. (1998). Neighborhood context and the risk of childbearing among
metropolitan-area Black residents. American Sociological Review, 63(3), 571–585.
Svarer, M. (2007). Working late—Do workplace sex ratios affect partnership formation and dissolution?
Journal of Human Resources, 42(3), 583–595.
Udry, J. R. (1983). The marital happiness/disruption level by level of marital alternatives. Journal of
Marriage and the Family, 45(1), 221–222.
White, L. K. (1990). Determinants of divorce—A review of research in the 80 s. Journal of Marriage and
the Family, 52(4), 904–912.
Community Effects on Divorce Risk in Norway 77
123